Spatial spill-overs from terrorism on tourism: Western victims in Islamic destination countries by Neumayer, Eric & Plümper, Thomas
  
Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper  
Spatial spill-over from terrorism on tourism: 
Western victims in Islamic destination 
countries 
 





Original citation: Neumayer, Eric and Plümper, Thomas (2016) Spatial spill-overs from terrorism 




© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67528/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) 
in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may 
not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research 
Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 








Spatial Spill-overs from Terrorism on Tourism: 
Western Victims in Islamic Destination Countries  
 
 




Eric Neumayer, Department of Geography & Environment, London School of Economics 
and Political Science (LSE) and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 
e.neumayer@lse.ac.uk (corresponding author) 






We analyze spatial spillover effects in international tourism as a consequence of 
transnational terrorist attacks. Specifically, we hypothesize that attacks executed in 
Islamic countries on citizens from Western countries will generate spatial spillovers of 
three kinds. Firstly, tourism from the victims’ countries to Islamic destination countries 
other than the location of the attacks will decline. Secondly, tourism from other Western 
countries to the country in which the attacks took place will decline. Thirdly, tourism 
from other Western countries to other Islamic destination countries also will decline.  
These spatial spillover effects occur because the terror message is strategically 
addressed at Western citizens in general rather than the tourists’ countries of origin per 
se. Tourists update their priors after such attacks, rationally expecting a greater chance 
of becoming victimized in other Islamic countries as well, given the transnational 
character of Islamist terror groups and the limited capacity of governments in Islamic 




Tourism is an important source of revenue for many predominantly Islamic countries. 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Bahrain generate more than 5% of their GDPs 
from tourism, the Maldives substantially more than that. However, dependence on 
income from tourism also makes these countries vulnerable to terrorism’s negative 
impacts. Countries that in the past have suffered from terrorist attacks on tourists, 
Egypt and Turkey, for example, have experienced plummeting revenues from tourism. 
Terrorists in these countries have a strong strategic incentive to target Western 
tourists. Not only will this generate considerable media attention, but such attacks also 
target the major sources of tourist inflows and the victims come from countries whose 
governments often support militarily, politically or economically the governments in 
Islamic countries that the terrorists wish to overthrow. If the terrorist threat is 
significant, official authorities in the countries where tourists originate will start issuing 
advice against travelling to the destination. Tourist operators will start taking tours to 
the country out of their programs owing to insufficient bookings, fear of liability suits 
and the like; they promote travel to other destinations instead. 
We demonstrate in this paper that terrorism in a predominantly Islamic country against 
citizens from a specific Western country of origin does not merely affect tourism to the 
country in which the attack takes place or tourism from the victims’ country of origin. 
Instead, the tourism-deterring effect spatially spills over into other Islamic destination 
countries and other Western origin countries. The decline in the number of tourists is 
largest for tourist inflows to the country where one’s citizens have been killed by the 
terrorist attacks from that same source country. However, the cross-border spillovers 
from transnational terrorism also are substantively important.  
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These results suggest that tourists understand one aspect of the logic of transnational 
terrorism fairly well: Terrorist attacks on Western tourists in Islamic countries typically 
are executed by terror groups with transnational strategic objectives. 1 They have an 
arbitrary character and terrorists therefore could have attacked other, similar targets in 
other, similar countries. As a consequence, if tourists respond to an observed terrorist 
attack, it does not make much sense to avoid only the country in which the attack took 
place, but also to bypass all sufficiently similar alternative destinations.  Hence, tourists 
correctly infer that if terrorists attack their fellow citizens in one country they also have 
an incentive to attack them in other similar destination countries. Similarly, tourists 
from other Western origin countries infer that they are more likely to become 
victimized in that and other similar destinations. As a consequence, terrorist attacks on 
Western tourists in one country will reduce the number of Western tourists that take 
holidays in other, similar countries.  
Our paper contributes and extends the literature on the impact of terrorism on tourism. 
Much of the existing literature uses qualitative research designs and finds effects on 
tourism in Ireland (Wall 1996), Cyprus (Mansfeld and Kliot 1996) and Egypt (Wahab 
1996). Quantitative research confirms these findings for Turkey (Feridun 2011), Greece 
(Drakos and Kutan (2003), Israel (Bar-On 1996), Spain (Enders and Sandler 1991), 
Austria, Italy and Greece (Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992). The same conclusions are 
reached in studies of 134 destinations (Llorca-Vivero 2008) and global samples (Pizam 
and Smith 2000; Neumayer 2004). Yet, only Enders and Sandler (1991), Enders, Sandler 
                                                        
1  For example, the so-called ‘Islamic State’ terror group recently published an ambitious ‘5-year 
plan’, in which it lays out its objective of gaining control over all of Africa North of the equator including 
West Africa and the horn of Africa, the Arab peninsula, plus Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh, all territories surrounding the Black Sea, the entire Balkans and even other parts of Europe, 
including Portugal and Spain, which once belonged to the territory of Al-Andalus. 
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and Parise (1992) and Drakos and Kutan (2003) allow for terrorist externalities to 
other countries. Our paper is – to our best knowledge – the first to take a spatial dyadic 
approach to analyze the cross-border externality effect of terrorist attacks. Accordingly, 
we do not ask whether a terrorist attack in one country affects tourism in similar 
destination countries. Rather, we ask whether a terrorist attack on citizens from one 
country affects tourism from the same place of origin to other similar destinations, 
tourism from other similar origins to the same destination, and tourism from other 
similar origins to other similar destinations.  
 
2 The strategic logic of terrorist attacks on tourists 
Almost all terrorist groups have territorial goals: in the long run, they intend to take 
over the governments in the country or region from which they originate. However, 
terrorism is the political instrument of the militarily weak. Therefore, terrorist groups 
are unlikely to reach their ultimate goals in the short run. In the absence of realistic 
chances of achieving their long-term goals of gaining political power and control over a 
territory in the short run, terrorist groups strive for achieving strategic goals (Kydd and 
Walter 2006; Enders and Sandler 2006; Neumayer and Plümper 2011; Plümper and 
Neumayer  2010a).  
These strategic goals can be divided loosely into two broad categories: The first 
strategic goal aims at organizational survival. This category includes recruiting new 
terrorists, winning support, especially financial, from peers, gaining access to safe 
havens, and attracting media attention to spread the group’s ideology. The second 
strategic goal aims at weakening the governments the terrorist groups intend to 
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overthrow. This category includes killing selected representatives of the government, 
destroying infrastructure, reducing the military support the governments receive from 
other nations, reducing the financial capabilities of the government, and so on. Crucially, 
it also includes weakening the economy on which governments depend for revenue.  
Attacking tourists fulfils many of these goals. In fact, the strategic goals are often best 
served if terrorist groups attack ‘Western’ targets.2 Western targets are attractive for 
terror groups in general and for Islamist terror groups in particular for various reasons: 
First, ‘the West’ supports many otherwise weak governments in Islamic nations, 
thereby stabilizing political order in these countries and preventing radical Islamist 
groups from gaining access to power. Second, most media companies are owned by 
Western corporations. Therefore, killing Western citizens is much more likely to attract 
global media attention than killing non-Westerners. Third, potential peers and potential 
recruits of radical Islamist groups typically are united by anti-Western sentiments. In 
addition, Western citizens, even civilians, are more easily dehumanized as apostates and 
as the symbols of everything against which the groups fight. In sum, Western targets are 
strategically promising for Islamist terror groups.  
Arguably, terrorist groups achieve greater influence on peers, supporters and potential 
recruits when they attack ‘hard targets’, as this demonstrates the capability of the terror 
group to overcome seemingly stringent security measures. Soft targets, such as tourist 
hotels or major sites that tourists visit, can be attacked without much preparation; an 
automatic gun or a bomb and a terrorist willing to commit suicide or to get arrested will 
usually do. Moreover, the cost advantages of attacking soft targets are reinforced by the 
                                                        
2  We develop this argument in greater detail in Plümper and Neumayer (2010a) and Neumayer 
and Plümper (2011). 
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effect such attacks have on the targeted country’s revenue stream from tourism. 
Tourists are sensitive to terror threats and flexible in their destination choices. Thus, 
attacks on soft targets predominantly aim at reducing the financial capabilities of the 
tourist destinations’ governments. The value of terrorist attacks on tourists goes 
beyond the fact that Western tourists are symbols of Western culture and are easily 
identifiable as different in predominantly Islamic countries. Attacks on tourists are 
attacks on an important source of revenue for the government.  
 
3 Data and methods 
Our dependent variable is the annual number of tourists from Western source or origin 
countries arriving in destination countries belonging to the Islamic civilization, or 
Islamic destination countries for short. Information comes from WTO (2015) and covers 
the years from 1995 to 2013. In order to determine the civilizational identities of nation 
states, we rely on two data sources that differ slightly in how countries are classified, 
namely the more restrictive classification by Henderson and Tucker (2001) and the 
broader classification by Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000), both of which operationalize 
the somewhat ambiguous verbal and map classification provided by Huntington (1993, 
1996) in his article and book on the so-called clash of civilizations. See the appendix for 
the classification of countries.  
Our main variables of interest are the terrorist spatial spillover variables. Formally, 
these are called “spatial-x variables” since they capture spatial spillovers in an 
explanatory variable from other dyads on the dependent variable rather than spillovers 
in the dependent variable itself. We estimate the following equation: 
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where ijty is the annual number of tourists from Western source countries i to Islamic 
destination countries j, , 1ijt tterr   is the number of either fatal terrorist incidents or 
terrorist killings involving citizens of country i in destination country j (both in years t 
and years t-1), 
itX  and jtX  are vectors of source- or destination-specific control 
variables, ij  are dyad fixed effects, tT  are year fixed effects and ijt  is an idiosyncratic 
error term. These controls effectively prevent the spatial spillover effects from 
spuriously picking up spatial clustering (Plümper and Neumayer 2010b) and effectively 
control for the main sources of potential endogeneity (Baier and Bergstrand 2007).3 
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exclusive directed dyad contagion. The first spatial-x variable (specific target contagion) 
counts the number of either fatal terrorist incidents or terrorist killings involving 
citizens of country i in Islamic destination countries other than the country j that 
comprise the dyad under observation. This variable tests whether terrorist attacks on 
citizens from a specific Western country in other Islamic destination countries deter 
                                                        
3  One could additionally include source- and destination-specific year fixed effects to account for 
what is known in the gravity literature as time-varying ‘multilateral resistance’ (Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2003; Klein and Shambaugh 2006; Baier and Bergstrand 2007). Such a model would include the 
maximum number of fixed effects that panel data allow and then only the effect of variables that vary at 
the dyad level over time can be estimated. Unfortunately, the (Pseudo-) Poisson maximum likelihood 
models did not converge with this extreme number of fixed effects included. In our experience, this is not 
an uncommon occurrence and represents a drawback of the (Pseudo-) Poisson maximum likelihood 
estimator that is otherwise well suited for gravity-type models (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006, 2010). 
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tourism from this country to the Islamic country under observation. The specific source 
contagion variable counts the number of either fatal terrorist incidents or terrorist 
killings involving other Western citizens in the Islamic destination country j that forms 
the dyad under observation. It tests whether terrorist attacks on other Western citizens 
in a specific Islamic destination country deter tourism from the Western country under 
observation to that destination country. The exclusive directed dyad contagion variable 
counts the number of either fatal terrorist incidents or terrorist killings involving other 
Western citizens in Islamic destination countries other than the dyad under 
observation. It tests whether terrorist attacks on other Western citizens in other Islamic 
destination countries deter tourism from the Western country under observation to the 
Islamic destination country under observation. 
We enter both the contemporaneous and the one-year lag of the terrorism and spatial 
spillover variables. Media attention is greatest in the immediate aftermath of attacks. 
However, many tourists will be locked into bookings previously arranged and may be 
unwilling to accept the already incurred costs as sunk. It also takes time to realize the 
full extent of the terrorist threat. Enders and Sandler’s (1991) and Enders, Sandler and 
Parise’s (1992) time-series analyses of the impact of terrorism on tourism in Spain and 
other Western countries suggest that often three to nine months pass by until tourist 
arrivals go down markedly.  
Our measures of terrorism are based on the “International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events” (Iterate) dataset (Mickolus et al. 2014a). It includes as acts of terror 
“the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political 
purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established 
governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and 
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behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims” (Mickolus et al. 2014b, p. 
2). Terrorist violence includes incidents as diverse as, among others, assassinations, 
bombings and armed attacks, arson and fire, kidnapping, and skyjacking, unless they are 
acts of ordinary crime or the violence is for purposes other than political, e.g., for drug 
trafficking. We focus exclusively on terrorist incidents that resulted in fatalities as these 
are those most likely to generate widespread media attention. Violence committed 
during international conflicts and civil wars are not coded as terrorism. Consequently, 
guerrilla attacks by rebel groups are not counted either, unless they are targeted against 
civilians or the dependents of military personnel (Mickolus et al. 1989, p. xii).  
The dataset compiles a wealth of information on each terrorist incident. What is most 
important for our purposes, it codes the country where the terrorist incident took place, 
the three primary nationalities of victims, as well as the number of people killed. 
Unfortunately, it does not list the precise number of fatalities belonging to each 
nationality. We therefore attributed all fatalities to all three of the victims’ primary 
nationalities in the relatively small number of cases for which more than one nationality 
of victims is recorded. 
We code from the dataset two variables: the annual number of terrorist incidents that 
resulted in fatalities and the annual total of people killed. One reason for employing 
both variables is that for the latter, Iterate indicates that, for a few terrorist attacks (less 
than 2%), the number of fatalities is unknown. For the killings variable, we coded these 
cases as involving one death.  
The information on the targeted countries and the nationalities of terrorist victims, 
combined with information on the civilizational identities of countries, allows us to 
create the directed country dyadic spatial-x variables of terrorist acts against Western 
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victims in countries belonging to the Islamic civilization that we described above. We 
lose observations on terrorist acts for which Iterate does not provide information on the 
primary nationality of victims, but these are very few in number and unlikely to involve 
Western victims.  
Our source- and destination-specific control variables follow a gravity-type model 
common in economics for explaining the dyadic flow of goods and services. Specifically, 
we include the (log of) population size and of GDP per capita in constant USD in both 
sending and destination countries, taken from World Bank (2015). So that our measures 
of terrorism and spatial terrorist spillovers do not spuriously pick up any effect from 
armed civil conflicts, we additionally include a variable that measures the ordinal 
intensity of armed conflict in a country based on the Peace Research Institute Oslo 
(PRIO)/Uppsala dataset. The general attractiveness of a destination country for a 
specific source country in terms of climate, cultural and historical attractions, 
geographical distances, and so on, are captured by dyadic fixed effects. Global ups and 
downs in the tourism sector are captured by the year fixed effects. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all main variables. In our sample and over the 
period of our study (1995 to 2013), we observe a total of 190 dyadic fatal terrorist 
incidents involving Western victims in Islamic destination countries, resulting in 1,402 
fatalities, although, as noted above, some double counting is unavoidable since all 
fatalities are allocated to all three main nationalities of victims in cases where more 
than one nationality is involved. These are considerable numbers, but clearly they are 
dwarfed by the number of fatal incidents and killings in which the victims come from 
the same or, to lesser extents, other Islamic countries. By far, the main victims of 
Islamist terror are Muslims, not nationals of the Western or other civilizations.  
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We follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2010) and estimate equation (1) with a 
(Pseudo-) Poisson maximum likelihood estimator, which correctly accounts for the 
existence of heteroscedastic residuals. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering 
observations on dyads. 
  
4 Results 
Our estimation results are presented in Table 2. The first two columns report results 
employing the number of fatal terrorist incidents and the number of terrorist killings 
based on the civilizational coding of Henderson and Tucker (2001), whereas the last 
two columns do the same, but based on the coding of Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000). 
The control variables all have the expected effects. More tourism emanates from and 
goes to larger and richer countries, while armed conflict in a country deters tourism 
flows.  
Focusing first on the more restrictive coding provided by Henderson and Tucker 
(2001), fatal terrorist incidents in the prior and in the same year involving victims from 
country i have the expected negative deterrent effect on tourist flows in this country 
dyad. The Poisson is a non-linear estimator, but its coefficients can be interpreted as 
semi-elasticities. One additional fatal incident is predicted to reduce the tourist flow by 
4.2 % in the same year and by 7.4 % in the subsequent one.  
We also find evidence for the expected negative specific target contagion effect: if 
nationals from country i have become victims of fatal terrorist incidents in other Islamic 
countries, this reduces the contemporaneous and subsequent flows of tourists in this 
country dyad.  Substantively, the effect is weaker than if the fatal terrorist incident took 
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place in the Islamic destination country under observation, which is of course as one 
would expect. One additional fatal incident in other Islamic destination countries is 
predicted to reduce the tourist flow from source country i to the destination country j 
under observation by 3.8 % in the same year and by 3.7 % in the next one. 
The substantive effects are again smaller for specific source contagion. The estimated 
coefficient for the contemporaneous term is negative, but statistically insignificant. 
There is less noise in the estimation of the one-year lag. Tourists from other Western 
countries are deterred by fatal terrorist incidents that involve other Western nationals 
in a specific Islamic destination country, with the estimated effect being 2.4 % for one 
additional fatal incident.  
Lastly, we also find evidence that fatal terrorist incidents in Islamic countries affect 
Western tourism to Islamic destinations beyond the specific source and destination 
countries involved in the incident. Our estimates suggest that such tourism declines by 
2.8 % both contemporaneously and with a one-year lag. 
A very similar picture emerges if we take terrorist killings rather than fatal terrorist 
incidents as our measure of the terrorist threat, as estimation results reported in 
column 2 show. The substantive effects seem to be much smaller in that, for example, 
one further terrorist killing of nationals from the source country of the dyad itself is 
predicted to reduce the subsequent tourism flow to that destination country by only 0.4 
% contemporaneously and with a one-year lag. However, one has to keep in mind that 
the range and the standard deviation are much larger for the terrorist killings variable 
than for the terrorist incidents variable. Expressed as predicted reductions in tourist 
flows following a one-standard deviation increase in our terrorist threat measures, the 
results are substantively similar. 
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The results also are similar if we employ Russett, Oneal and Cox’s (2000) civilizational 
coding instead, as the remaining two columns show. The lag structure is somewhat 
different, but we continue to find statistically significant effects for the dyad under 
observation and for target and directed dyad contagion. The main difference is that we 
do not find statistically significant source contagion effects (the two lags also are not 
jointly statistically significant) when we employ this alternative coding. One reason that 
there is less clear evidence for source contagion, in comparison to target contagion, and 
that the estimated substantive effects are also smaller for source relative to target 
contagion is that the media attention is likely to be strongest in the country from which 
Western tourist victims originate. Thus, stories about attacks on British citizens, for 
example, will feature in German, French and other Western media but will receive most 
attention in the United Kingdom itself. This is likely to result in a stronger contagion 
effect among other target (destination) countries, reducing tourism from that source 
country, than the contagion effect among other source countries that reduces tourism 
from other source countries.  
We have undertaken a number of robustness tests. First, we have tested for non-linear 
effects and, on the whole, found no such evidence. Second, we have tested for causal 
heterogeneity by running separate estimates for Islamic destination countries above 
and below the median of national dependence on tourism revenue, measured as the 
share of exports that stems from tourist revenue, averaged over the years from 2005 to 
2012. We did not find systematic differences. Third, we have entered the lagged 
dependent variable as an additional way of shielding the estimates from spuriously 
finding evidence for spatial effects when there are none, following the advice in 
Plümper and Neumayer (2010b). The estimates are reported in Table 3. If anything, the 
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evidence for our hypotheses of spatial spillover effects in the impact of terrorism on 
tourism is even clearer.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In this article we have tested the hypothesis that terror attacks have important spatial 
spillover effects, focusing entirely on Western tourism to Islamic destination countries. 
Western tourists, on average, seem to understand the strategic logic of Islamist terror 
groups. When they hit Western targets, the specific nationalities of their victims are 
somewhat arbitrary and so is the predominantly Islamic destination country in which 
they execute their acts of terror. The real targets are all Western tourists and all Islamic 
destination countries. 
Terrorist attacks on tourist destinations in one country therefore do not reduce only 
tourist flows to the targeted tourist destinations and from the countries whose 
nationals have been attacked. Rather, such attacks have spatial spillover effects, 
reducing, if to a lesser extent, tourism flows from other similar source countries to the 
same destination country, tourism flows from the same source country to similar 
destination countries and even tourism flows from similar source countries to similar 
destination countries. This empirical finding provides further reasons for regional 
cooperation in anti-terrorism policies among Islamic destination countries since 
countries cannot shield themselves from the negative consequences of terrorism on 
tourism by preventing such attacks only in their own country.  
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Appendix. Coding of Countries/Nationalities as Western or Islamic. 
 
Henderson and Tucker (2001)  
 
‘West’ includes all of Western Europe, plus Australia, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, New Zealand, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, United States, Western Samoa.  
 
‘Islamic’ includes Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, 
Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, 
Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.  
 
Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000)  
 
‘West’ includes all of Western Europe, plus Australia, Barbados, Canada, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Grenada, Hungary, Israel, Jamaica, Latvia, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Trinidad, United States, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.  
 
‘Islamic’ includes Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
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Table 1. Summary statistics. 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
arrivals 11247 45,831 198,649 1 4,811,873 
ln GDP pc (origin) 11247 10.15 0.85 6.64 11.97 
ln GDP pc (destination) 11247 8.05 1.22 5.33 10.75 
ln population (origin) 11247 16.00 1.89 10.33 19.57 
ln population (destination) 11247 16.09 1.97 11.23 19.34 
armed conflict  (destination) 11247 0.25 0.52 0 2 
annual sum fatal incidents 11247 0.02 0.15 0 4 
annual sum killings 11247 0.12 3.09 0 202 
target contagion (inc. Russett) 11247 0.66 1.76 0 16 
source contagion (inc. Russett) 11247 0.46 1.16 0 8 
dyad contagion (inc. Russett) 11247 19.34 10.71 1 49 
target contagion (kill. Russett) 11247 4.17 16.87 0 203 
source contagion (kill. Russett) 11247 2.92 18.46 0 407 
dyad contagion (kill. Russett) 11247 121.86 114.05 1 492 
target contagion (inc. Hend.) 9712 0.70 1.83 0 16 
source contagion (inc. Hend.) 9712 0.43 1.11 0 8 
dyad contagion (inc. Hend.) 9711 17.79 10.27 1 44 
target contagion (kill. Hend.) 9712 4.34 17.50 0 203 
source contagion (kill. Hend.) 9712 2.72 18.27 0 407 




Table 2. Estimation results 
 
Civilizational coding: Henderson Henderson Russett Russett 
Measure of terrorism: fatal incidents killings fatal incidents killings 
     
ln GDP pc (origin) t 1.810*** 1.792*** 1.361*** 1.400*** 
 (0.462) (0.462) (0.447) (0.444) 
ln GDP pc (destination) t 0.906*** 0.934*** 0.935*** 0.961*** 
 (0.215) (0.210) (0.233) (0.221) 
ln population (origin) t 2.224** 2.166** 0.261 0.287 
 (1.109) (1.104) (1.153) (1.157) 
ln population (destination) t 1.655*** 1.621*** 1.633*** 1.643*** 
 (0.412) (0.413) (0.397) (0.393) 
armed conflict int. (destination) t -0.215*** -0.225*** -0.162** -0.175** 
 (0.0811) (0.0853) (0.0774) (0.0808) 
annual sum (incidents/killings) t -0.0423** -0.00394** -0.0236 -0.00136 
 (0.0202) (0.00172) (0.0253) (0.000898) 
annual sum (incidents/killings) t-1 -0.0741*** -0.00436** -0.0701*** -0.00514** 
 (0.0194) (0.00175) (0.0200) (0.00247) 
target contagion t -0.0380** -0.00461** -0.0226 -0.00182*** 
 (0.0171) (0.00184) (0.0180) (0.000701) 
target contagion t-1 -0.0372*** -0.00318* -0.0226* -0.00337 
 (0.0128) (0.00182) (0.0118) (0.00263) 
source contagion t -0.0120 -0.00309* -0.00284 -0.000287 
 (0.0171) (0.00180) (0.0173) (0.000616) 
source contagion t-1 -0.0235* -0.00213 -0.0101 -0.00228 
 (0.0133) (0.00178) (0.0117) (0.00264) 
directed dyad contagion t -0.0277* -0.00403** -0.0179 -0.00124** 
 (0.0161) (0.00183) (0.0168) (0.000610) 
directed dyad contagion t-1 -0.0277** -0.00233 -0.0180* -0.00265 
 (0.0117) (0.00182) (0.0104) (0.00263) 
Observations 9,711 9,711 11,247 11,247 
Dyads 703 703 828 828 
 
Notes: (Pseudo-)Poisson maximum likelihood estimation with dyad and year fixed effects. *, **, *** notes 
statistical significance at the .1, .05 and .01 level. 
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Table 3. Estimation results with lagged dependent variable included 
 
Civilizational coding: Henderson Henderson Russett Russett 
Measure of terrorism: fatal incidents killings fatal incidents killings 
     
arrivals t-1 2.78e-07*** 2.74e-07*** 2.67e-07** 2.63e-07** 
 (9.46e-08) (9.74e-08) (1.22e-07) (1.24e-07) 
ln GDP pc (origin) t 2.057*** 2.023*** 1.404*** 1.428*** 
 (0.487) (0.491) (0.464) (0.463) 
ln GDP pc (destination) t 1.082*** 1.050*** 1.090*** 1.070*** 
 (0.172) (0.166) (0.205) (0.191) 
ln population (origin) t 3.939*** 3.856*** 1.703 1.695 
 (1.166) (1.180) (1.249) (1.262) 
ln population (destination) t 2.002*** 1.907*** 1.883*** 1.850*** 
 (0.390) (0.389) (0.391) (0.386) 
armed conflict int. (destination) t -0.117* -0.117* -0.0807 -0.0857 
 (0.0596) (0.0632) (0.0548) (0.0581) 
annual sum (incidents/killings) t -0.0570*** -0.00674*** -0.0405 -0.00235*** 
 (0.0206) (0.00172) (0.0275) (0.000876) 
annual sum (incidents/killings) t-1 -0.0796*** -0.00640*** -0.0725*** -0.00778*** 
 (0.0233) (0.00176) (0.0257) (0.00219) 
target contagion t -0.0416*** -0.00706*** -0.0315*** -0.00250*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00164) (0.0117) (0.000658) 
target contagion t-1 -0.0394*** -0.00485*** -0.0247*** -0.00564*** 
 (0.00850) (0.00150) (0.00850) (0.00217) 
source contagion t -0.0177 -0.00611*** -0.0136 -0.00139** 
 (0.0121) (0.00169) (0.0121) (0.000649) 
source contagion t-1 -0.0227** -0.00458*** -0.0127 -0.00523** 
 (0.00976) (0.00157) (0.00897) (0.00230) 
directed dyad contagion t -0.0310*** -0.00667*** -0.0259** -0.00205*** 
 (0.00977) (0.00167) (0.0111) (0.000609) 
directed dyad contagion t-1 -0.0349*** -0.00448*** -0.0263*** -0.00538** 
 (0.00831) (0.00154) (0.00811) (0.00225) 
Observations 8,901 8,901 10,249 10,249 
Dyads 689 689 805 805 
 
Notes: (Pseudo-)Poisson maximum likelihood estimation with dyad and year fixed effects. *, **, *** notes 
statistical significance at the .1, .05 and .01 level. 
 
 
 
